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Abstract—Ride-sharing is a service that enables drivers to share their trips with other riders, contributing to appealing benefits of
shared travel cost and improved access to transportation. However, the majority of existing ride-sharing services rely on a central third
party, which make them subject to a single point of failure and privacy disclosure concerns by both internal and external attackers.
Moreover, they are vulnerable to distributed denial of service (DDoS) and Sybil attacks due to malicious users involvement. Besides,
high service fees should be paid to the ride-sharing service provider. In this paper, we propose a decentralized ride-sharing service
based on public Blockchain, named B-Ride. B-Ride enables drivers to propose ride-sharing services without relying on a trusted third
party. Both riders and drivers can find rides match while preserving their trip data, including pick-up/drop-off location, departure/arrival
date and travel price. However, under the anonymity of the public blockchain, a malicious user may submit multiple ride requests or
offers, while not committing to any of them, in order to discover better offer or to make the system unreliable. B-Ride solves this
problem by introducing a time-locked deposit protocol for a ride-sharing by leveraging smart contract and zero-knowledge set
membership proof. In a nutshell, both a driver and a rider have to show their good willing and commitment by sending a deposit to the
blockchain. Later, a driver has to prove to the blockchain on the agreed departure time that he has arrived at the pick-up location. To
preserve rider/driver privacy by hiding the exact pick-up location, the proof is performed using zero-knowledge set membership proof.
Moreover, to ensure fair service payment, a pay-as-you-derive methodology is introduced based on the elasped distance of the driver
and rider. In addition, we introduce a reputation-based trust model to rate drivers based on their past trips without involving any
third-parties to allow riders to select them based on their history on the system. Finally, we implement our protocol and deploy it in a
test net of Ethereum. The experiment results show the applicability of our protocol atop the existing real-world blockchain.
Index Terms—Ride-sharing services, Blockchain, Smart contract, Ethereum, Fair Payment, Zero-knowledge proof, Trust, Reputation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
O VER the last few years, ride-sharing services (RSSs)have been emerging as an alternative transportation
services that allow people to use personal cars more wisely.
In RSSs, a driver shares his vacant car seats with other riders
who are traveling in the same direction. Thus, contributing
to several benefits to the individual and the community at
large by increasing occupancy rates, sharing travel costs, ex-
tending social circles, and reducing both fuel consumption
and air pollution [1], [2]. Across the world, many providers
that offer online ride-sharing services such as Flinc, Uber-
Pool, Lyft Line and Blablacar have emerged. According
to [3], the ride sharing market is projected to reach USD
218 billion by 2025.
A ride-sharing service consists in matching drivers with
appropriate riders according to their respective ride offers
(i.e., planned trips) and ride requests (i.e., desired trips).
To enable ride-sharing service, users (i.e., drivers and rid-
ers) have to share with a service provider the trip detail
information, including departure time and location, and the
destination. The service provider works as a middleman to
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facilitate the communication between the system users and
usually charges a commission for each successful ride-share.
However, given that users data are centralized and stored at
the central service provider, makes the system vulnerable
to a single point of failure. If the security of the service
provider is compromised, the service can be interrupted
and the data can be disclosed, altered, or even deleted. For
instance, Uber has witnessed a tremendous data leakage of
57 million customers and drivers for more than a year, and
it has paid 148 million just to settle an investigation to its
data breach [4], [5]. Similarly, in April 2015, due to hardware
failure in Uber China, a service outage has emerged and
passengers were not able to stop their orders at the end of
services [6]. In addition, in order to maximize their own
benefits, most of the ride-sharing service providers impose
a high services fee that can scale up to 20% [7].
In contrast to the traditional client-server model,
Blockchain1 is a verifiable, immutable and distributed
ledger that allows mistrusting entities to transact with each
other without relaying-on a central third party. Blockchain
is a transparent data structure that is organized as a chain
of blocks and managed by a network of computers run-
ning a peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol. Each block contains
a set of transactions that are committed by the network
peers according to a predefined consensus algorithm [8]–
1. In this paper, we remark that blockchain is used to refer open
blockchain. A permissionless/public blockchain is a blockchain net-
work that lets any party to participate and leave, as opposed to the less
ambitious way of building blockchain atop permissioned parties.
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2[10]. Blockchain has been first introduced as a distributed
cryptocurrency that enables the transfer of electronic cash
without the intervention of banks. It has evolved, afterward,
beyond that to support the deployment of more general-
purpose distributed applications. This concept has been
introduced by Vitalik Buterin and refers to it as smart-
contracts or decentralized autonomous organizations [11].
Smart-contract can be described as an autonomous com-
puter program running on blockchain network. This pro-
gram acts as a contract where the terms of the contract can
be pre-programmed with the ability to self-execute and self-
enforce itself without the need for trusted authorities [12].
In this paper, we propose to implement a ride-sharing
service using smart-contract to mitigate to the single point
of failure issues presented in the client-server architecture.
However, beside being completely distributed and transpar-
ent, the openness of blockchain leads to a potential privacy
concern where the data can be publicly accessible. Despite
the use of pseudonyms for authentication, this is not suffi-
cient to protect the privacy of the end users. For instance,
by tracking the activity of a driver or rider on blockchain,
an attacker with a little background knowledge of that
user can figure out all his location traces [13]. Moreover,
because in public blockchain anyone can join and transact
in the network anonymously, malicious users can disturb
the function of a blockchain-based ride-sharing by sending,
for instance, multiple requests/offers while not committing
to any of them. Therefore, it is required to keep track of
users’ behaviours and build a reputation system that help a
user to select with confident an appropriate driver/rider for
his ride request/offer, respectively.
Subsequently, in order to decentralize ride-sharing ser-
vices in a meaningful way, the privacy concern with re-
spect to rid-sharing, needs to be carefully evaluated and
addressed. This mainly require to resolve two conflicting
objectives, i.e., (i) the desire to have a transparent system
while protecting users privacy, and (ii) ensure accountability
while being anonymous.
1.2 Contribution
Motivated by the above challenges, in this paper, we intro-
duce B-Ride a Blockchain-based Ride sharing services with
preserving privacy and establishing trust between drivers2
and riders. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first
to employ ride-sharing services atop open and permissionless
blockchains. B-Ride aims to remove intermediaries between
riders and drivers and make use of blockchain and smart
contracts vetting to the future of ride-sharing services.
Our main contributions and the challenges the paper
aims to address can be summarized as follows:
1) A blockchain based protocol is proposed to realize
decentralized ride-sharing services. To preserve riders’
trip privacy, we uses the generalization/cloaking, so a
rider posts a generalized pick-up and drop-off location
as well as pick-up time. Then, interested drivers uses
off-line matching technique to check if the request
falls on his generalized route and then send the exact
2. Hereafter we use the term ”driver” to refer to individuals or
companies that own vehicles or buses that can be used in a ride-sharing
services.
information trip data encrypted with riders’ public key.
Then, a rider can select the best-matched driver to have
a trip based on some heuristics. This acts as a dis-
tributed auction that is handled through the blockchain
to ensure transparency.
2) To ensure prior trust between a rider and a selected
driver, we propose a time-locked deposit protocol for
ride-sharing services based on the zero-knowledge set
membership [14]. The core idea is to define claim-or-
fine methodology that works as follows; (i) A rider
has to post a smart contract with a deposit budget as
an acceptance to a specific driver’s offer as well as a
set of different obfuscated locations. (ii) The selected
driver also should deposit a budget to the contract as a
commitment to his offer. (iii) Upon arrival at the agreed
pick-up location, the driver acts as (a prover) and sends
a proof to pick-up location to the blockchain. Specifically,
the driver proofs that the pick up location falls in a
predefined set of cells. (iv) Finally, a smart contract acts
as a (verifier) by checking the proof in a zero-knowledge
manner and then assign rewards to driver in case of
valid proof or fine the driver in case of invalid or if no
proof is sent before the agreed pick-up time.
3) Also, we propose a fair service payment in a trust-
less manner between the driver and rider. A driver
needs to send at a regular interval an elapsed distance
to the rider who authenticate it by signing it using
his private key. Then, once the rider provides proof-
of-elapsed-distance (i.e., the elapsed distance and driver’
signature on it), the smart-contract transfers the fare to
the driver. In this way, the driver get paid as he drive.
Meanwhile, if the rider stops sending proofs to the
blockchain, he can stop the trip immediately. Moreover,
only elapsed distances are stored on the blockchain and
no other sensitive information are leaked to the public.
4) Finally, B-Ride builds the reputation of drivers based on
their prior behaviours in the RSSs. Unlike, current cen-
tralized trust approaches [15], we implement a decen-
tralized reputation management mechanism over the
blockchain that is executed in a self-enforcing manner
once a predefined set of conditions are met. Specifically,
in B-Ride each driver has two reputation indices; (i)
The first index is increased every time a driver sends
a valid proof of his arrival to the pick-up location. (ii)
The second index is increased upon the completion of
each trip. Based on the two indices, each driver will
have a trust value in B-Ride that will be used by riders
to decide about the drivers to select for their next trips.
Our reputation mechanism make economic incentive
for drivers to behave correctly, otherwise they will will
not be selected by anyone.
5) To showcase the feasibility of applying our protocol, we
implement the system on top of Ethereum, a real-world
public blockchain platform. Intensive experiments and
performance evaluations are conducted in an Ethereum
test network.
We believe that B-Ride will enable more lucrative jobs
in rural regions, where full-time employment is often
hard to come by.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
3we discuss preliminaries used by this research work. We
describe the network and threat models, followed by the
design goals of our system in Section 3. A detailed desrip-
tion of our system is presented in Section 4. We present the
security, privacy, and computation complexity analysis of
our scheme in Section 5. Section 7 discusses the previous
research work. Finally, we give concluding remarks in Sec-
tion 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the necessary background on
blockchain, smart contracts and some cryptographic tools
that we have used for this research.
2.1 Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Blockchain serves as a fundamental structure of emerging
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [16] to help make a peer-
to-peer exchange of value without a centralized third party.
A blockchain is a distributed, immutable, and append-only
data structure formed by a sequence of blocks that are
chronologically and cryptographically linked togather [11],
[17]. Fundamentally, blockchain is a network composed
of a set of nodes called miners or validators are respon-
sible for keeping a trustworthy record of all transactions
through a consensus algorithm in a trust-less environment.
More importantly, blockchain enables the essence of smart
contracts which can be defined as programs that every
blockchain node will run them and update their local repli-
cas according to the execution results without fraud or any
interference from a third party. The main characteristics of
the blockchains are described as follows. Transparency since
the transactions stored on the blockchain are visible to all
participants in the network. Liveness since all participants
can reach the same blockchain and new blocks with valid
transactions will continue to be added [13]. Eventual consen-
sus because transactions stored on the blockchain should be
validated and a secure consensus protocol ran among all
participants to agree on its global state [18]. Blockchain ad-
dress (Pseudonym), the sender of a message in the blockchain
is referred to a pseudonym, known as blockchain address. In
practice, a blockchain address is usually bound to the hash
of a public key [19], [20]; more importantly, the security of
digital signatures can further ensure that one cannot send
messages in the name of a blockchain address, unless she
has the corresponding secret key. Also, the program code
of a smart contract deployed in the blockchain can also be
referred by a unique address, such that one can call the
contract to be executed, by committing a message pointing
to this unique address.
2.2 Notations
Let PG be a pairing group generator that on input 1k outputs
descriptions of multiplicative groups G1 and GT of prime
order p where |p| = k. Let G∗1 = G1\{1}. The generated
groups are such that there exists an admissible bilinear map
e : G1 × G1 → GT meaning that (1) for all a, b ∈ Zp it
holds that e
(
ga, gb
)
= e(g, g)ab; (2) e(g, g) 6= 1 and (3) the
bilinear map is efficiently computable. H is a collision-resist
hash function that maps strings of arbitrary length to Zp.We
denote u ∈R Zp as randomly choosing a number from Zp.
TABLE 1: Key Notations in B-Ride.
Notation Represent for
d, r Denotes a driver or rider.
αr The one-trip blockchain address used by rider r
to anonymously interact with the blockchain.
l
(d)
k , t
(d)
k A pair of time and location.
Γ(r) =
{(
l
(r)
0 , t
(r)
0
)
, l
(r)
1
}
A ride request (desired trip).
Γ(d) =
{(
l
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0
)
, . . . ,
(
l
(d)
φ , t
(d)
φ
)}
A ride offer (planned trip).
C
(r)
o , C
(r)
d , T
(r)
o Rider r: generalized pickup, drop off, and time
δR Spatial slack distance that a rider willing
to walk to driver pick up location.
τR Temporal slack delay time that a rider willing
to wait.
φ, pi A set of locations and proof/attestation sent
from a driver i to authenticate
a location is in the set in Zero-knowledge.
βAPd Driver’ reputation index of arrival to pick-up
location.
βADd Driver’ reputation index of arrival to drop-off
location.
H Secure hash function.
C Encrypted ride-offer.
C Commitment value.
q,G1, G2, P, e Public parameters of bilinear pairing
2.3 Zero Knowledge Set Membership Proof(ZKSM)
A set membership proof enables a prover to prove, in a zero-
knowledge way, that a secret value lies in a given public set.
The set can perhaps be a list of cities or clubs. Typically, such
proofs can be used, for example, in the context of electronic
voting, where a voter is required to prove that his secret
vote belongs to the set that contains all possible candidates.
We are going to use Camenisch and Stadler [21] notation for
proofs of knowledge:
PK(δ, γ) : Y = gδhγ ∧ (γ ∈ φ) (1)
Where Y = gδhγ is is a Petersen commitment of the
integer δ ∈ Zp using randomness γ. The above proof will
convince the verifier that the secret in the commitment Y lies
in the set φ. The set φ can be a common input to both prover
and verifier, and this statement that a proof is a commitment
to an element of φ without having to explicitly list φ in the
proof. The Set membership proof can be instantiated in the
discrete logarithm setting and made non-interactive with
Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We refer the readers to [21] for the
detailed construction.
The security guarantees are: (i) soundness, that no prover
can convince a verifier if she did not compute the results
correctly; (ii) zero-knowledge, that the proof distribution can
be simulated without seeing any secret state, i.e., it leaks
nothing about the witness. Both above will hold with an
overwhelming probability.
3 MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we describe the considered network and
threat models. Also, we define the adverbial assumptions.
The main notations used in this paper are given in Table.
3.1 System model
As depicted in Fig. 1, the considered system model has the
following entities.
1) Blockchain Network. The blockchain network should
meet the following properties: (i) Permissionless that
4Riders
Drivers
LBS
Blockchain Net.
Before-ride comm.
On-ride comm.
1
3
5
2
4.2
4.1
Fig. 1: System architecture: (1) The rider publishes a ride
request contract to the blockchain (2) Drivers sends their
encrypted offers. (3) A rider select the best matched offer
and publish a time-locked contract. (4.1) and (4.2) Up on ar-
rival, the driver sends a proof of arrival to pick-up and claim
rider deposit (5) The rider publishes a payment contract that
transfer the fare trip to the driver.
means any interested party (e.g., an anonymous per-
son, or company) can read and post messages on the
blockchain network. (ii) Support an intrinsic digital cur-
rency meaning that the blockchain can be interpreted
as a public ledger in which each participating parties
have a currency balance. (iii) Support smart contracts
(as described in Section 2.1). At the time of this writing,
Ethereum [11] is the most widely adopted example
of such an open permissionless blockchain which also
supports smart contract, and thus is a recommended
realization of our proposed work.
2) Drivers and riders. Both drivers and riders are interested
parties who seek to share a trip. Drivers/riders use their
smart-phones to communicate with the blockchain 3.
Also, besides the localization capabilities (e.g., GPS),
the phones of both drivers and riders support peer-
to-peer wireless communication (e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi
Direct) [22].
3) Location based service (LBS) provider: The LBS provider
role is ensure that the pickup location is authentic. In
our scheme, driver upon arriving to pickup location,
he/she should send pickup to the blockchain. For LBS,
it could be the Roadside units in Vehicular Adhoc
Networks (VANETs) [23], where each RSU can verify
if the location provided by a driver falls in its coverage
or not.
Following the principle in ridesharing in practice [24],
we do not require perfectly matching between ride offers
and requests (w.r.t. locations and times). Thus, spatial and
temporal slacks are introduced to capture the maximum
distance δ that the riders can accept to walk, and the
3. Note that drivers and riders are not required to store a complete
copy of the blockchain. Instead, they can even run on top of so-called
light-weight nodes, which eventually allows them receive and send
messages only related to ride sharing activities [5]
maximum time τ that they can accept to wait. In this paper,
we consider the following ride sharing cases:
1) Identical ridesharing. The pickup and drop off of both a
driver and rider match both spatially and temporally as
shown in Fig. 2.a.
2) Inclusive ridesharing. The destination of the rider lies on
the driver’s route. In this case, driver must stop several
times for pick-ups and drop-offs as shown in Fig. 2.b.
There are cases like detour ridesharing in which the
driver should first change his route to deliver the rider to its
destination. Since these complex type of ride sharing needs
decision making by drivers and riders and/or may require
adding compensations for detouring. We leave this for our
future work.
3.2 Adversarial and threat Assumptions
Security threats in a ride sharing system come from both
internal and external adversaries. In this paper, we follow
the standard blockchain threat model in [13], blockchain
in our proposed design is maintained by a set of valida-
tors/miners, and is trusted for execution correctness and
availability, but not for privacy. Running on top of it, the
smart contract is guaranteed to work as specified, free from
tampering. The contract code is visible and checkable by
anyone once it is deployed. Likewise, any data submitted
and stored to the contract can be directly read by all parties
in our system, as well as any others having access to the
blockchain. Also, we consider the following adversarial
threats that may come from
• Gobal eavesdroppers who can see all previous recorded
transactions on the blockchain for the riders such that
they seek to learn their moving patterns, guess their
locations at a specific time or even track them over the
time.
• Adversarial riders and drivers. A portion of riders and
drivers can be malicious. For instance, a rider may
perform a location cheating attack by reporting a false
planned trip to the blockchain, to match a driver in
advance and fraudulently not commit to the request
such that the driver has to travel a long way to pick up
the rider. Likewise, A driver may unfairly match more
riders while deliberately not committing to this offers
or by accepting other better ride offers.
• Cheating in the fare payment. Another misbehaviour in
a RSS is the fare payment of the trip. If the driver get
paid before start the trip, he/she may misbehave and
do not complete the trip. Also, if the driver gets the trip
fare at the end of trip, the rider may be not willing to
pay the fare [25].
3.3 Design Goals
Under the aforementioned system model and adversarial
assumptions, our design goal is to develop a ride-sharing
service with the following design goals:
1) Achieves decentralization. The proposed scheme should
enable decentralized ride sharing services to avoid cen-
tralized ride-matching agencies.
2) Preserving riders’ privacy. The proposed scheme should
preserve riders privacy including their trip data i.e.,
5Drop-off
Area
Pick-up
Area
Driver Route
Passenger Route
(a) Identical (b) Inclusive
Fig. 2: Ride sharing cases under consideration in B-Ride.
pick up/drop off. This can be satisfied if the follow-
ing two conditions can be achieved: (i) none of the
drivers/miners except for the selected driver learns the
exact position of the rider or the driver. (ii) A specific
rider cannot be tracked over time.
3) Ensuring prior trust between riders and drivers. The pro-
posed work should discourage malicious behaviour
of both drivers and riders under the permissionless
framework of the blockchain. This objective is a chal-
lenge especially under the open public permissionless
blockchain.
4) Fair service payment. The service payment should be
done in a trust-less manner. The scheme should protect
honest drivers from dishonest riders and also protect
honest riders from dishonest drivers.
5) Reputation Management: The proposed scheme should
keep track of drivers’ behavior in the system. Malicious
drivers who may try to subvert the system, even irra-
tionally may be identified by a low reputation. By hav-
ing a trust value for each driver, if a driver misbeahves,
his reputation worsens and the other riders mistrust
him more and more and are less and less interested to
interact with him.
4 OUR PROPOSED SCHEME: B-RIDE
In this section, we discuss in details B-Ride with six phases:
trip data generation, bidding and selection phase, Time-
locked deposit protocol, fair service payment, reputation
trust management.
A driver (independent person or company) becomes a
legitimate entity after registration on the registration author-
ity, such as the government by getting a certificate bound
to his/her identity. A driver, d having a unique identity
(e.g., license plate number), creates a public-secret key pair
Kpubd ,K
pri
d and registers at the RA to obtain a certificate
binding Kpubd to d. Note that this phase is done off-line and
only once per life.
4.1 Generating Trip data
In this stage, we discuss who the drivers/riders create their
planned trips.
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13
c14 c15 c16 c17 c18 c19 c20
c21 c22 c23 c24 c25 c26 c27
`
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0
`
(d)
1 , t
(d)
1
`
(r)
orig`
(d)
2 , t
(d)
2
`
(d)
3 , t
(d)
3
Fig. 3: Illustration of dividing the ride sharing area of
interest into cells for the state of NY, USA. A driver d’s
route, in blue, with 4 points, and pickup and destination
for a passenger r.
For privacy preservation reasons, we use the general-
ization technique [2] or rather known as Spatial cloaking.
The main idea of such technique is to blur a user’s exact
location into a spatial region in order to preserve his location
privacy. We assume the ride sharing area A (e.g., a state)
where the ride sharing services are deployed is divided into
geographic areas, called cells. A possible design for such
cells could be a predefined geog graphic area (e.g., districts
or neighborhoods in a city, uniform partitions in a map, etc).
Fig. 3 illustrates the division of the state of Tennessee, USA.
Also, the exact pick-up/drop-off times are generalized to
time intervals T (e.g., 5 min, 10 min, 15 min, etc.)
For a driver d who is interested in sharing his vehicle
with others, he/she should perform the following.
1) For each driver d ,we denote his planned trip (i.e., ride
offer)
Γ(d) =
{(
l
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0
)
, . . . ,
(
l
(d)
k , t
(d)
k
)
, . . . ,
(
l
(d)
φ , t
(d)
φ
)}
that consists of an origin and set off time
(
l
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0
)
, a
destination and estimated arrival time
(
l
(d)
φ , t
(d)
φ
)
, and a
sequence of optionally intermediate locations and their
corresponding times
(
l
(d)
k , t
(d)
k
)
.
2) Then, the driver d generalizes his exact trip locations
and times to zones and time intervals as follows:
Λ(d) =
{(
C
(d)
0 , T
(d)
0
)
, . . . ,
(
C(d)n , T
(d)
n
)}
(2)
where
(
C
(d)
0 , T
(d)
0
)
represents the generalized location
and time corresponding to
(
`
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0
)
.
3) Finally, d creates a set of all possible subsets of the
elements in Λ(d) as.
Λ̂
(d)
k = {
(
C
(d)
orig, T
(d)
orig, C
(d)
dest
)
, }06k6φ (3)
where the number of possible trips φ depends on the
number of points n in the driver’ trip and it can be
mathematically expressed as [26](
n
2
)
=
n!
2!(n− 2)!
6Rider Blockchain Drivers
C
(r)
o ← `(r)0
C
(r)
dest ← `(r)dest
T
(r)
o ← t(r)o
Λ̂(r) = {C(r)o , T (r)o , C(r)dest}
Λ̂
(d)
k ← Λ(d)
Check if: Λ̂(r) ⊆ Λ̂(d)k
Cd1 := EncKpubr [`
(d1)
0 , t
(d1)
0 , `
(d1)
dest, t
(d1)
dest, Bd1 ]
...
Cdn := EncKpubr [`
(dn)
0 , t
(dn)
0 , `
(dn)
dest , t
(dn)
dest , Bdn ]
∀di : i ∈ [1 : n] ,Check:
1) ‖`(di)0 − `(r)0 ‖ ≤ δr ∧ ‖t(di)0 − t(r)0 ‖ ≤ τr
2) ‖`(di)dest − `(r)1 ‖ ≤ δr ∧ ‖t(di)dest − t(r)dest‖ ≤ τr
3) argmin
∀di
(δr, τr, Bdi) ∧ argmax∀di
(βdi)
Fig. 4: Illustration of the bidding and selection phase in B-Ride.
For a rider r, we denote its ride request as Γ(r) ={(
l
(r)
0 , t
(r)
0
)
, l
(r)
1
}
that specifies an origin and desired set off
time
(
l
(r)
0 , t
(r)
0
)
and a destination l(r)1 . Similar to the driver,
the rider also convert the request into the generalized form
by mapping the locations (resp. times) of the request into
the
Λ̂(r) = {
(
C
(r)
orig, T
(r)
orig, C
(r)
dest
)
} (4)
Note that generating the drivers’ trip table and the rider
planned trip (3), (4) are done off the blockchain and can
be done previously using the driver/rider smart phone
devices.
4.2 Bidding and selection phase
In this subsection, we describe the process of matching
riders requests with drivers offers atop public blockchain.
A schematic diagram of this phase is illustrated in Fig. 4.
This phase is done as follows.
4.2.1 Publishing the ride request
First, as a fundamental concept to avoid de-anonymization
in the blockchain, we let a rider r to generate a temporary
public/private key pair (Kprir ,Kpubr ) (e.g., by using ECDSA)
and a corresponding blockchain address ADDr (i.e., a
one-request-only address for each ride request. The address
ADDr is used interact with the blockchain (e.g., submitting
the ride sharing request contract, adding deposit, selecting
drivers or receiving refunds).
Then, a rider publishes a ride request that contains
his/her generalized pickup/drop off (C(r)orig, C
(r)
dest) and gen-
eralized time T (r)orig . Also, the request should include dead-
line of receiving driver’s offers. Optionally, the request can
include maximum number of offers to be received. Note that
this request should be signed by the temporary private key
of the rider, and once the miners validate the corresponding
signature of the rider, it will have immutable address L and
be public to all drivers.
4.2.2 Submitting drivers’ biddings
After the riders publish their requests to the blockchain, in-
terested drivers can routinely query the blockchain for new
requests or some out-of-band signaling protocol can be used
to notify drivers of new riders’ requests [27]. Then, drivers
evaluates the request by checking whether the request Λ̂(r)
satisfy the spatio-temporal features of their own planned
trips Λ̂(d)k i.e., Λ̂(r) ∈ Λ̂(d)k .
Then, the offer should include all necessary information
for the rider such as the exact pick-up and corresponding
time pair
(
`
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0
)
, the exact drop-off and corresponding
time pair
(
`
(d)
dest, t
(d)
dest
)
and the offer bid price Bdi (e.g., price
per mileage).
Then, the driver uses the rider public key to encrypt all
above information to obtian Ci
Ci = Ek
(
`
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0 , `
(d)
dest, t
(d)
dest
)
Where E is asymmetric encryption algorithm e.g., RSA,
DSA. This is required to prevent adversaries from getting
such sensitive information except the rider Then, the driver
send the tuple Cdi‖Bdi as a transaction to the blockchain.
Note that we do not allow the driver to encrypt the bidding
price so that to allow drivers to send competitive prices.
Therefore, riders can make use of this auction and select
based on their preferences in a trasperent way. Note that
since the rider request includes the a deadline to receive
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pair
Location
cooridinates(`) Time
(`
(d)
0 , t
(d)
0 ) 40.730610,−73.935242 [8:55]
(`
(d)
1 , t
(d)
1 ) 40.730610,−73.935242 [9:10]
(`
(d)
2 , t
(d)
2 ) 40.730610,−73.935242 [9:15]
(`
(d)
3 , t
(d)
3 ) 40.730610,−73.935242 [9:25]
TABLE I
LOCATIONS COORDINATES AND TIMES
Cell-time
generalized Pair Cell (C) Time Interval (T)
(C(d)0 ,T
(d)
0 ) C1 [8:50, 9:00]
(C(d)1 ,T
(d)
1 ) C2 [9:05, 9:15]
(C(d)2 ,T
(d)
2 ) C5 [9:10, 9:20]
(C(d)3 ,T
(d)
3 ) C6 [9:20, 9:25]
TABLE II
GENERALIZED DRIVER ROUTE
Corig Torig Cdest
C(d)0 C
(d)
2 [8:50, 9:00]
C(d)0 C
(d)
4 [8:50, 9:00]
C(d)1 C
(d)
5 [9:05, 9:15]
. . .
B 13 C
TABLE III
DRIVER TRIPS TABLE
offers, drivers can send their encrypted bids only if the the
dead line is not expired.
4.2.3 Finding Feasible Matches
After the contract L collects for example n offers
{Cd1 , · · · , Cdn}, a rider r first retrieve the encrypted offers
from the blockchain and decrypts each bid using his secret
key. Then, the rider can evaluate the offers as follows.
1) Checks whether the driver pick-up and drop-off loca-
tions match both
-spatially (within the rider space) using:
|`diorig − `rorig| ≤ δr ∧ |`didest − `rdest| ≤ δr, (5)
- and temporarily (within the rider time) as in
|tdiorig − trorig| ≤ τ r ∧ |tdidest − tRdest|, (6)
2) Besides, in B-Ride, each driver sending an offer should
have a reputation trust value βdi that is stored on
the blockchain. The details of how each driver trust
reputation value is discussed in details in the next
subsections.
Based on δr , τ r, bid price Bdi and drivers’ trust value
βDi , the rider can select the best matched driver as
follows:
argmin
∀di
(δr, τ r,Bdi) ∧ argmax∀di
(βdi)
Note that selecting the best offer depends on different
riders’ preferences. For instance, some may prefer an
offer with a high space slack δr but with a low bid price.
Note that The bidding and selection phase is handled
over the blockchain and is therefore fully transparent
unlike existing centralized approaches
4.2.4 Illustrative example for the selection/matching phase
To make a concrete example of the selection process. As-
sume a driver di who has a fixed route that is shown in Fig 3.
The driver’s route starts in Knoxville, and ends in Nashville
with four points of interest that lies on the his road. Note
that, defining these points depends on the driver himself.
For example, for drivers who may not be willing to have
many stop points on their trip, they can just define small
number of point of interests. Then, using these locations,
Table II gives the exact location cordinates with correspond-
ing times of the planned trip. As discussed previously in
Sec. 4.1, the driver’s route should be generalized/mapped to
as given in Table III according to cell divions given in Fig. 3
of Tennessee. Then, the driver creates his own trip table
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for B-Ride contract
1 contract BRide
2 mapping(address => int) Reputation
Index_1 // Mapping for drivers’
reputation index of arriving to
pick-up
3 mapping(address => int) Reputation
Index_2 // Mapping for drivers’
reputation index of completed trips
4 contract BiddingSelectionContract
5 Create a sub-contract of Algorithm 1
6 contract TimeLockedDeposit
7 Create a sub-contract of Algorithm 2
8 contract PaymentContract
9 Create a sub-contract of Algorithm 2
contains possible trips he can share his ride as indicated
in Table IV.
let a rider r is looking for a ride with the following
features:
Γ(d) = (35.222;−100.1511, 4548754, 35.221;−100.1511)
Then, the rider publishes a ride request to the blockchain
that contains generalized points of his request,
Λ̂(r) = {(Utica, 45222211, Syracuse)}
Then, Up on posting this transaction to the blockchain,
interested drivers determine if they can send ride offers or
not. For example, based on the trip table of driver in Table
IV, the driver can determine that the rider request is in its
route i.e., the 4th element in Table IV. Then, he/she sends
the exact pick-up, drop-off and time encrypted to the the
rider. Finally, the rider evaluate the offer and compare it
with other driver’s offers received and decide best matched
offer.
4.3 Time-locked deposit for ride-sharing
After the bidding and selection of phase, in B-Ride, we ad-
dress the following challenge ”can we ensure fairness between
riders and drivers and mitigate rational adversaries (from both
drivers and riders) from misbehaving under the fully decentralized
framework of the blockchain?”. In other words, assume anony-
mous driver who made a ride request on the blockchain and
intentionally do not commit to that request. The same goes
for drivers. Usually, a traditional solution to the previous
challenge is to allow both parties (i.e., drivers and riders)
to pay a subscription fee to a trusted agency that can be
8contacted to restore fairness whenever fairness is breached.
However, this solution may fail since a honest party has
to expend extra effort to restore fairness by contacting
the trusted party whenever a breach occurs [28]. Also, an
adversary essentially gets away with cheating since an third
party must be trusted to not collude with the adversary.
Inspired by [28], we propose a time-locked deposit pro-
tocol for ride-sharing service leveraging smart contracts. A
smart contract accepts a rcoins deposit from a ”rider” and a
dcoins and the contract conditionally transfers the contract
balance ( both rider and driver deposits) to the ”driver” if
he arrives to the rider pick-up location of the predefined
agreed time. If the driver defaults, then both deposits is
returned to the rider after a prespecified time as a fine to
the driver. Note that conditions defined on a smart contract
and handled over the blockchain, ensures that they are
completely transparent and secure. However, defining these
conditions is another challenge due to privacy concerns. In
other words, how the driver can prove to the blockchain
that he has arrived to the agreed rider pick-up location
(so the blockchain enforces rewards) without revealing such
sensitive information on the public blockchain.
Our strategy is to adopt the zero-knowledge set mem-
bership proof (ZKSM) protocol presented in Sec. 2.3. In nut-
shell, after selecting an offer from a driver, the rider should
publishes a contract with the a predefined set of locations as
well as his deposit. the driver acts as a prover who should
prove to the blockchain verifier in a zero-knowledge that he
arrived to pick-up location without revealing exactly which
pick-up location has been used by the (prover) driver. A
schematic diagram of the time-locked deposit protocol is
depicted in Fig. 5.
Detailed of the time-locked deposit protocol is given in
the following phases.
4.3.1 Service Initialize:
In this phase, the rider do the following.
1) First, he defines a set φ of m locations where φ =
{`1, · · · , `m}. Note that the set should include the rider
pick-up location `(r)o as well as a set of other obfuscated
locations.
2) Then, he picks a random number x ∈R Zp and com-
putes a corresponding public y ∈ gx, where g be the
generator of the order −q subgroup of Zp
3) Then, for every element i ∈ φ, he computes a signature
Ai = g
1
(x+i) .
Finally, the rider publishes a contract given in Algo-
rithm. 2 with the set φ and Ai to the blockchain.
4.3.2 Claim or fine functionality
First, the driver should verify the rider signature on each
element in φ using the co responding public key4. This is
required to enable the driver to prove to the smart contract
that the agreed pick-up location is a valid element in the
set φ. If the verification succeeds, the driver should add a
deposit d coins to the contract within a window time e.g.,
4 min (See line 15 in Algorithm 2). This is required for two
4. The purpose of this verification is to prevent a malicious rider from
falsely setting-up the ZKSM protocol so he can manipulate the rewards
Passenger
Block #111
The blockchain
1. Publish Time locked 
deposit:
Publish anonymously contract 
with promised deposit as in 
Algorithm 1.
2. Send D Deposit
Send  D deposit coins 
to contract as an offer 
acceptance.
4. Claim
if the proof is valid:
1) Send the contract balance 
to the driver if proof is valid;
2) Update driver reputation.
5. Refine
Send the contract 
balance to the 
passenger as a fine to 
the driver.
3. Send proof of arrival 
to pick up location
Driver
Block #110
Block #112
Fig. 5: The schematic diagram of B-Ride the protocol as
proof-of-concept.
reasons. First to indicate that both the driver and the rider
accept to have a planned trip together. In other words, if the
driver does not add his deposit, this means he will is not
committing to the trip. Second, to fine the driver in case of
not committing to his offer in the agreed time.
Then, later on, once the driver arrives to the pick-up
location, a claim of fine functionality works as follows.
1) First, the driver picks v ∈R Zp and `(r)o ∈ φ and com-
putes V =
(
A
`
(r)
o
)v
. Then, he computes a commitment
on `(r)o using Pedersen commitment [29] as C = g`
(r)
o hr
where h be a random group element such that it is hard
to find the discrete logarithm of g base h or vice versa.
Also, he computes a signature σr(`
(r)
o ) where r is his
private key. and sends the tuple C, `(r)o , σr(`
(r)
o ) to the
LBS provider where σr(`
(r)
o ) is the driver signature on
`
(r)
o .
2) Then, the LBS provider verifies if the provided location
of the driver is authentic. One possible way is to allow
the roadside unit in the VANET to ensure if received
location falls in its coverage. The, the LBS Computes
C ′ = Cg−`
(r)
o = g`
(r)
o hrg−`
(r)
o = hr
where the hr is the public key corresponding to r. Then,
the LBS verifies the driver signature σr(l
(r)
o ) is valid
using the driver public key hr . Then, the LBS send a
signature on the C σLBS(C) back to the driver.
3) The driver picks random numbers s, t,m ∈R Zp and
computes
a = e (V, g)
−s
.e (g, g)
t
, and Q = gshm
Note that the adopted ZKSM in [14] is interactive
which means that the prover must answer challenge
messages sent by the verifier in order to convince him
that the proof is valid, what requires multiple rounds of
communication. However, in the context of blockchain,
we would like to avoid this communication overhead,
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• Picks x ∈R Zp
• Computes y ∈ gx.
• Computes Ai = g1/(x+i) ∀ i ∈ φ
Publishes smart contract, with:
-the set φ and Ai
-the ride deposit
Receives d coins from the driver, trans-
fer the contract balance to the driver if
he provides a proof that have commit-
ted to being in the pick-up location.
• Picks r ∈ Zp
• Computes C = g`
(r)
o hr
• Computes σr[`
(r)
o ]
C‖σr[`(r)o ]
• Computes R = Cg−[`(r)o ] = hr
• Verifies σr[`
(r)
o ]
• Computes σLBS(C)
• Picks v ∈ Zp and σ ∈ φ
• Computes V = Avσ
• Computes a = e (V, g)−s e (g, g)t, Q = gshm
• Computes c = H((V ‖a‖Q))
• Picks s, t,m and computes
Zσ = s− σc, Zv = t− vc, Zr = m− σcProofOfArrival(pi, σLBS(C))
S
σPKR(S)
Fig. 6: Time-locked deposit protocol in B-Ride.
because either (i) validating nodes i.e., miners can not
properly agree on how to choose those challenges, since
in many constructions we have to choose them ran-
domly, while the verification algorithm of ZKSM must
be deterministic in order to reach consensus; or (ii)
because it would make the communication complexity
of our system very poor. Nevertheless, the FiatShamir
heuristic [30] is a generic technique that allows to
convert interactive zero-knowledge schemes into non-
interactive protocols. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, a
challenge c can be calculated from public parameters as
follows
c = H(V ‖a‖Q)
Then, he computes zσ = s −
(
`
(r)
o
)
c, zv = t − vc and
zr = m− rc.
Then, the proof of ZKSM is denoted as pi =
C‖c‖a‖Q‖zσ‖zv‖zr. Finally, he sends pi‖σLBS(C) as a
transaction to the blockchain.
4) Once the contract T receives the set-mempership proof
pi, it should verify whether the proof is from the selected
driver as well as check whether the time of receiving
the proof lies on the generalized rider pick-up time (See
lines 19-20 in Algorithm 2). Then, proving that C is a
commitment to an element ∈ φ can be validated by the
following statement [14].
PK
{
(`(r)o , r, v) : C = g
`(r)o hr ∧ V = g
v
x+`
(r)
o
}
(7)
Proving the statement in 7, is done in the blockchain as
follows by checking the following conditions:
Q ?= Cchzrgzσ (8)
a
?
= e (V, y)
c · e (V, g)−zσ · e (g, g)zv (9)
Once the function PROOFOFARRIVAL(seeline) validate
the two conditions in 8, 9, the driver will claim his
deposit back and the rider driver. Due to the Soundness
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and Completeness property of ZKSM [14], the contract
will accept the proof if it is correctly constructed by
the driver. If the driver aborts or breaks the task his
commitment which is pre-defined in the time locked
deposit protocol, he will be fined with a monetary
penalty that goes to the rider account. This can happen
once the time expired, the rider can call the function
RefineDriver() (see line in Algoritm).
4.3.3 Driver/rider authentication
After the validating the proof and receiving the rewards,
it is required prevent malicious rider (who does not ini-
tialize the contract with the ride deposit) from having a
free-ride with the driver. Therefore, the actual rider who
made the ride reservation should authenticate himself to
the driver. In specific, the rider should prove to the driver
in zero knowledge that he/she indeed knows the value
of private key corresponding to the public key that made
the reservation. The driver (the verifier) selects a uniformly
random integer (S ∈ Zp as a challenge as sends it to the rider
(the prover). The rider should calculate a signature on the
challenge σPKR(S) and sends (S‖σPKR(S)) to the driver.
Finally, the driver Verifies if V erifySig(pkr, σs{s},S) = 1.
If the rider passes these verification step, the driver can start
the trip with the rider.
4.4 Fair payment without trust between the rider/driver
Finally, in B-Ride, we address the following challenge how
should a decentralized platform can protect riders from dishonest
drivers and protect drivers from dishonest riders in the fare
calculation?
In current RSS, a driver uses his personal smartphone to
report the distance and duration of each ride for fare cal-
culation to the service provider. Then, the service provider
can calculate the fare of the trip. However, smartphones
are general-purpose devices and are easy to tamper with.
Thus, a malicious driver can modify her smartphone to
report longer ride distances to the and, as a result, charge
a higher fare. This problem is usually referred to as over-
charging [22], [25]. In addition, if the payment is done at the
beginning of the trip, a dishonest driver may intentionally
not complete the trip. Also, if the payment is done at the
end of the trip, a dishonest rider may intentionally pay the
fare.
In B-Ride, we tackle above challenges using the method-
ology pay-as-you-drive as follows. After starting the trip, the
rider should post a contract with a budget deposit. Note
that the down payment used in the time locked deposit
protocol should be used as a part of the trip fare. Every
short period of time, say every minute, the driver should
send elapsed distance to the rider. The rider checks whether
the distance provided matches the distance elapsed. Note
that the elapsed distance can be created using a smart
phone with a GPS. And then generate a signature on that
distance and send it to the smart contract. The function
ProofOfDistance (see lines 8-16) in Algorithm. 3 ) will
validate the rider signature. Then the payment corresponds
to that distance will go to the driver address. By this way,
the rider can ensure that the the payment is done according
to the actual distance that has been travelled. More impor-
tantly, if the rider stops sending proofs, the driver can stop
the ride, and vice versa if the driver decides not to stop the
trip, he/she will not get any payment. Finally, if the rider
does not arrive in the a pre-agreed time in the driver offer.
The remaining payment can back to the rider account (See
function Refund in algorithm ). This encourage the driver to
complete the trip in the agreed time.
4.5 Reputation Trust Management
In B-Ride, the driver can proof his arrival to the pickup
location, but intentionally not meet/or not take the rider.
In this case, the system cannot distinguish if the rider or
the driver is sheeting. To ensure that the driver will not
misbehave again (in case he is the one who misbehaved), we
will record this in the blockchain as a suspecting behavior,
if this will happen lot of time in the future, this will affect
his reputation and his future offers will not be accepted by
riders. In other words, we are interested in the accountabil-
ity of drivers in a decentralized ride-sharing system. The
reason for why we focus on the driver, since riders have to
pay deposit when they accept a driver offer and the driver
has the responsibly to prove his arrival to the pick-up
Each driver is assigned with a reputation index which
can be viewed as one of the important reference for riders
when they choose a certain driver offer. A high reputation
index of driver can reflect their behaviour and to building
trust among drivers and riders. Unlike traditional ride shar-
ing schemes where the reputation management is managed
and controlled by the third party, we define the protocols
and implement them in the decentralized blockchain. Each
driver is tagged with a reputation index βd. Each driver
has two reputation indices value, one related to his proof
of arrival to the agreed pick up location βAPD and proof of
completing the trip βAPd .
βd =
{
βAPd Increases if a valid proof to pick-up location
βADd If the trip was completed successfully,
βAPd driver’s reputation will be increased and recorded
in blockchain if the function ProofofArrival validates
his proof of arriving to the rider pick up location.
Once the trip is completed. The driver reputation βADdi
reputation index is increased (see line in algortihm).
Note that driver can only update the reputation in-
dex βAPd . But β
AD
d can only be updated once the trip is
completed and the payment is done. Therefore, evenif the
dishonest driver tries to collect honest riders deposits with
not completing the trip. The βAPd will be increased while
the βADd remains smaller than β
AD
d . Therefore, a driver d
reputation index βd can be calculated as:
βd =
βAPd
βADd
(10)
A higher βd i.e., βd > 1 denotes that a greedy driver do
not commit to his offers. Meanwhile, drivers with βd ≤ 1
means the driver is mostly trusted and he is committing to
his ride offers. Therefore, a rider can decline a ride offer
from a driver if his reputation in the system is low. βd.
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Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for time locked deposit contract T in B-Ride
1 contract TimeLockedDeposit
2 uint public Balance // Balance to withhold driver and rider deposits
3 address payable rider // Rider address
4 address payable driver // driver address
5 uint public RiderDeposit // RiderDeposit
6 uint public DriverDeposit // DriverDeposit
7 address [] Set // set of obfuscated locations
8 address [] Ai // Signatures of elements in the set
// Constructor
9 function TimeLockedDeposit(_driver, _Set, _Ai)
10 driver ← _driver; // The address of selected driver
11 Balance ← _RiderDeposit ;// This deposit acts as acceptance to the driver offer.
12 Set ← _Set;
13 Ai ← _Ai;
14 function DriverDeposit(uint256 _DriverDeposit)
// Receive Driver Deposit and add to the contract
15 if block.timestamp ≥ expiration return;
16 if msg.sender 6= DriverAddress return;
17 if msg.value 6= DriverDeposit return;
18 if now ≥ TAcceptdeadline return;
// TAcceptdeadline is a window for the driver to send his deposit e.g., 2 min
19 Balance ←_DriverDeposit;
20 function ProofOfArrival((pi, σLBS(C)])
// pi = {D‖c‖a‖Q‖zσ‖zv‖zr}
// If the driver provides a valid proof of the agreed pickup location, he will be
rewarded by the rider deposit and he get his deposit back.
21 if msg.sender 6= DriverAddress return;
22 if now 6= T (r)o return;
// Check the time of receiving the proof lies in the generalized rider pick-up time
23 if (ZKSM.Verifier(pi))
// ZKSM.Verifier is a library embedded in the runtime environment of smart contract
such as EVM
24 BRide.Reputation Index_1[msg.sender]← Reputation Index_1[msg.sender]+1;
// Increase the driver reputation index of arriving to pick-up location
// call public event Transfer to finalize the payment
25 transfer(balance, driver);
26 end
27 function FineDriver()
// Issue a rider deposit back and the driver deposit and if the timeout has expired.
28 if block.timestamp < expiration return;
29 if msg.sender 6= rider return;
30 transfer(balance, rider); // Transfer the contract balance back to the rider account.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section we evaluate our proposed system B-Ride.
Usually, anything within the blockchain environment is
refereed as being on-chain, while anything that exists outside
the blockchain is referred as off-chain. Fig. 7 shows a a proof-
of-concept implementation of our system B-Ride.
5.1 On-chain cost
5.1.1 Etherum Baselines and Performance Metrics
Ethereum has two native tokens: ether and gas. Ether is
the currency, ethers are minted by miners and traded on
exchanges. Gas, on the other hand, is used to run smart
contract code. Separating ether and gas allows the gas cost
of an operation to be hard-coded in the Ethereum protocol.
By separating ether and gas, the price of ether is decoupled
from the price of using Ethereum. Therefore, the costs listed
in the Ethereum protocol can be static, while a user can
determine how much ether a unit of gas is worth per trans-
action at a given time. Each operation in a smart contract
Blockchain
B-Ride	Ride-Sharing	Service	Contract
Riders	
(ZKSM	Set-Up)
Drivers
(ZKSM	Prover)
	3.	Send	encrypted	offers
1.	Generate	trip	data	offine
Off-chain
In-chain
Blockchain
Layer
Application
Layer
2.	Anonymously	post	
a	ride	request
ZKSM	Verifier
	
Smart	Contract	Virtual	Machine
Fig. 7: Implementation overview of B-Ride.
has a fixed cost. For instance, the addition of two variables
requires 3 gas, multiplication costs 5 and computing a SHA3
hash needs 30 gas plus 6 gas for every 256 bits of input [11].
Therefore, for the on-chain cost, we are interested in the
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Algorithm 3: Pseudocode for the fair payment contract
in B-Ride
1 contract RidePayment
2 address payable rider // Rider address
3 address payable driver // driver
address
4 uint public TripDist // driver address
// Constructor
5 function RidePayment(_driver,
_TripDist, _t(R)d )
6 _driver ← _driver // A greed
distance of payment
7 TripDist ← _TripDist // A greed
distance of payment
8 function ProofOfDistance(ElapsedDist)
// If this is called with the rider,
the driver gets paid.
9 if msg.sender 6= RiderAddress
return;
10 while TripDist ≤ ElapsedDist do
11 transfer(balance × ElapsedDist),
pk_d) // Decrease balance
according to the travelled
distance by the rider and
driver
12 TripDist ←
_TripDist-Elapsed_Distance ;
13 if (TripDist==0)
14 B-Ride.Reputation
Index_2[DriverAddress]←
Reputation
Index_2[DriverAddress]+1;
// Update the reputation driver
index of completed trips
15 end
16 end
17 function withdrawFunds()
// Issue a refund back to the rider
if the timeout has expired.
18 if block.timestamp < expiration
return;
19 if msg.sender 6= owner return;
20 transfer(balance, owner) // Transfer
the contract balance back to the
rider account.
following Metrics.
• Transaction cost. is the overall gas cost to complete the
transaction to the blockchain,
• Execution cost. indicates the portion of gas spent on the
code manipulating data and computation on the EVM.
• Storage cost. Denotes the cost of storing the data in
blockchain.
Previous metrics can be translated to compute direct
monetary cost on both drivers and riders, and hence the
practicality, of running our platform.
TABLE 2: The precompiled contracts used in B-Ride
Operation Address Operation Description
PAIRING 0x08 100.000 + 80.000 ×k Optimal atepairing check.
ECMUL 0x07 40.000
Elliptic
curve scalar
multiplication.
EXPMOD 0x05
⌊
f(max(lM ,lB))·max(l′E ,1)
GQUADDIV ISOR
⌋ Big integer
modular
exponentiation.
Note: Note that in the PAIRING, k denotes the number of points or,
equivalently, the length of the input divided by 192. The variables
for computing the gas cost of EXPMOD are specified in details in EIP
1981 8. The other three operations act on the elliptic curve alt bn128.
5.1.2 Implementation and Results
We have implemented a smart contract for Algorithm in
Solidity 5. B-Ride 6 were deployed into the public Kovan
Testnet 7. However, in B-Ride, verifying the ZKSM requires
some calculation-intensive mathematical and cryptographic
functions to be done in the time-locked deposit protocol.
However, implementing these functions in a high-level lan-
guage, such as Solidity, which inturn would require the
execution to be costly in terms of the gas. Therefore, these
functions have been implemented as a precompiled contract,
which creates a dedicated opcode for these operations. By
using precompiled contracts, less gas is required, as the
code is not run on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), but
rather on the machine hosting the Ethereum client. Typically,
a precompiled contract is assigned a fixed address and gas
price and can be invoked using the call operation. Table 2
gives the precompiled contracts used in this paper.
Fig. 8a reports the gas consumption costs on the rider.
About 330K gas is required for publishing the bidding
contract. Then, 80 Kgas is required to retrieve the drivers’
offers. 320 K gas is needed to deploy the time-locked de-
posit contract. 340K gas is required for the deploying the
payment contract, and 42K gas is needed for calling the
ProofOfDistance function.
Fig. 8b reports the gas consumption required by a driver
to complete a trip. First the driver requires 89K gas to send
his encrypted offers to the bidding contract. Then, once the
driver is selected to start a trip, he needs 25 Kgas to send
his deposit to the time-locked contract. Finally, to validate
the proof (pi) lies in the set, verifing the ZKSM requires 360K
gas.
Fig. 9 shows the estimated total cost of driver versus
the number of riders, given different gas prices 0.5, 5 and
Gwei and Ether price $217 as of June 25th, 2019 [31]. Having
40 trips, the driver costs about $ 2. By increasing the gas
price, the driver costs increase to reach $ 7.6 for completing
40 trips. It can be clearly seen that the cost is practically
affordable
Fig. 10 gives storage cost in Bytes on the blockchain in B-
Ride. It can clearly seen that as the number of offers received
by drivers increases, the storage increases. For example, for
5. https://github.com/ethereum/solidity
6. We note that B-Ride contract in Algorithm 1 can be coded as a
single ”factory contract” in which upon receiving a message with the
variable arguments from both entities i.e., riders and drivers, will create
a new instance of the child contracts Algorithm 2 and Algorithm
7. https://kovan.etherscan.io
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7 offers received, the storage on the blockchain is about 12
KBytes. 7 We consider these results practically acceptable.
6 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
6.1 Analysis of the protocol
Correctness and efficiency. In B-Ride, the rider will have the
trip and the driver would receive the right amount of pay-
ment. If they all follow the protocol, under the conditions
that (i) the blockchain can be modeled as an ideal public
ledger, (ii) the underlying SKSM is of completeness, and (iii)
the public key encryption is correct. Regarding efficiency, we
note the on-chain compuutaion interms of gas consumption
and and storage is actually light. Moreover, in ZKSM, using
the precompiled contracts, the verification can be efficiently
executed by checking only a few pairing equalities.
Security analysis (sketch). We briefly discuss security of B-
Ride.
Regarding the data confidentiality of riders’ activities in B-
Ride, all related public transcripts are simply the ciphertexts
C1, . . . , Cn, the ZKSM proof pi, and the elapsed distances of
the trip. The ciphertexts are easily simulatable according to
the semantic security of the public key encryption, and the
proof pi can also be simulated without knowing the secret
due to the zero-knowledge property. And by elapsed distance
can not reveal any information since it is explicitly known
to the rider and the driver.
Regarding the anonymity of riders, an adversary has
two ways to break it:(i) link a driver/rider through
his blockchain addresses; (ii) link offers/requests of a
driver/rider through his proofs of arrival. (ii) link o a
driver/rider in the payment phase. The first case is trivial,
simply because the rider will interact with a randomly
generated one-request-only blockchain address (and the cor-
responding public key). The second case is more involved,
but the anonymity of the rider can be ensured by the zero-
knowledge property of the underlying ZKSM. Moreover,
the rider can change the set elements each for each trip by
having different locations in the set. This is allowed due
to the feature of the ride-sharing model in which rider can
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walk to reach the driver. The last threat is prevented because
only the elapsed distance of the trip is pubic and no other
information about the rider destination is leaked to others.
Regarding the security against a malicious rider, a mali-
cious rider has four chances to gain advantage: (i) submit
multiple requests to intentionally make fake reservations;
(ii) cheat in the ZKSM set-up phase by providing a set
φ with fake signatures Ai for the set elements in order
to prevent the driver from claiming his trip deposit; (iii)
sending the contract a fake instruction i.e., proof of arrival to
pick-up in the name of driver to manipulate the claim/fine
phase; (iii) cheat in payment phase. The first one is mitigated
since drivers only accept to plan a trip with a rider only after
he adds a ride deposit to the smart contract. The second
threat is prevented because the time-locked smart contract
is public, and the driver can validate the ZKSM set-up using
the security of digital signatures. The third threat is handled
by the security of digital signatures since the contract has
to ensure the driver is the one who should claim the trip
deposit. The last issue is trivial, since the public blockchain
security enables the driver to check if the rider provides a
valid elapsed distance to the payment contract.
Regarding Security against malicious drivers, the ways that
malicious drivers can cheat are: (i) submitting multiple ride
offers to intentionally let other riders to have fake planned
trips to make the system unreliable; (ii) cheat by claiming
riders’ deposits and not complete the trips with them; (iii)
cheat in payment phase. The first threat is mitigated by
letting the driver to add a deposit to the time-locked deposit
contract. Moreover, if the driver does not provide a proof of
arrival to pick-up location, he will be fined by this deposit.
The second threat is prohibited by the soundness of the
underlying zkSM, which means any incorrect instruction to
pass the verification in the smart contract, directly violates
the proof-of-knowledge. Moreover, our system builds a rep-
utation system for the driver incase of proofing the arrival
to the pick-up and starting the trip with the rider. In this
case, the driver reputation index of arriving to the pick will
increase significantly with his reputation index of competed
trips. The third threat is simply handled by allowing the
rider to check the distance provide by the driver.
6.2 B-Ride have the following security/privacy features
1) Enable decentralized ride-sharing service. Thanks to the
blockchain technology, no single entity or authority is
required to monopolize the system for its own benefit or
even to some drivers than others. Moreover, the selec-
tion process of drivers and riders works as a distributed
auction that is handled over the blockchain that ensures
transparency for both entities. Also, B-Ride uses smart
contracts which are immutable and tamper-proof that
no party can alter their code or interfere with their
execution without the consent of all the nodes in the
network.
2) Preserve privacy of riders’ activities. In B-Ride, the pri-
vacy of riders (their ride requests including the pick-
up, drop-off and pick-up times) is protected by (i)
replacing the rider’s real identities by some placehold-
ers (pseudonyms) for ride requests that correspond to
temporary public-private key pairs. The pseudonym
expires once the rider finishes a ride request to the
blockchain which ensures unlinkabilty. (ii) The use of
generalization/cloaking technique in the bidding and
selection phase, preserves the rider trip information. As
the size of the generalized area increases, the privacy of
a ride request is well preserved.
3) Achieves backward privacy. B-Ride prevents an adversary
with a background knowledege of a specific rider pick-
up location (for example, his home or work address)
to discover information about his trip or track him over
time (This is known as backward privacy). This is because
drivers offers are encrypted by the rider temporary
public key which changes for each ride request. (iii)
Also, by using zero-knowledge set membership proof
allows the driver (the prover) to prove to the blockchain
that the pick-up location is in the predefined set defined
by the rider with conceals the exact location to the
blockchain (verifier).
4) Ensure prior trust between drivers and riders. In B-Ride,
both the rider and the selected driver should lock
deposits to a time-locked deposit contract. By this way,
anonymous riders are encouraged to commit to thier
ride requests since they lose their deposit if they do
not commit to the request. Also, a driver who does not
proof his arrival to the pick-up location is penalized.
5) Achieves fair service payment. B-Ride enables payment in
a trust-less manner between the rider and driver with-
out involvement of any third parties/intermediaries.
Both the rider is aware of the elapsed distance and the
payment will be done in case of both parties agree on
it. If a dishonest rider stops sending the proof that they
are together, no payment can be done and the driver
can stop the ride. Also, since the blockchain is tamper-
proof, the fair payment smart contract is executed and
the promised fare will be delivered if the suitable proof
will be provided.
6) Achieves Reputation managment of drivers. B-Ride builds
a reputation managment system that is designed such
that rational drivers (even if purely selfish ones) are
interested in honestly cooperating in the system. Due
to the tamper-proof nature of the blockchain, driver
reputation history can not be tampered with. Unlike
centralized managment systems, our management is
controlled by conditions defined by smart contracts.
Therefore, selfish drivers who wants to deviate from
our system will be identified by low trust values. Also,
our reputation mechanism is robust against tampering
attacks in centralized setting where the third party can
even unfairly change a driver reputation positively or
negatively.
7) Resist to double reservation attack. An anonymous rider
can not accept a ride twice since accepting an offer re-
quires the rider to lock coins to the time-locked deposit
contract. If a rider accepts two offers, he has to lose his
deposits.
7 RELATED WORK
Ride-sharing received a lot of attention in the literature [35].
Security and privacy in the centralized setting (client-server
model) of ride-sharing service is discussed in [22], [36].
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TABLE 3: Comparison between our system B-Ride and existing RSS platforms
Architecture Rider’s privacy Trust Fair payment Transparency
Current RSS 9 Centralized × © × ×
SRide: [32] Centralized
√ × × ×
Co-utile [2] Decentralized
√ × × ×
DACSEE [33], Arcade
City [34] Blockchain × × ×
√
B-Ride Blockchain
√ √ √ √
Note:
√
denotes a functionality a realized feature;© denotes a (partially) realized function by relying on a central trust × denotes an unrealized
feature.
Some companies starts developing a blockchain based ride
sharing platform e.g, DACSEE 10 arcade city 11 but without
location privacy or anonymity. In the following, we review
some of the existing solutions. Table. 3 compares with B-
Ride with existing platforms.
In the centralized-setting, in [32], SRide has been pro-
posed to address the matching between between drivers and
riders in ridesharing systems while protecting the privacy
of users against both the service provider and curious
users. The service provider uses a filtering protocol based
on homomorphic arithmetic secret sharing and secure two-
party equality test to determine the subset of drivers with
whom the rider can travel.
A decentralized ride sharing scheme with reputation
is proposed in [2]. The scheme uses Pastry application to
enable proximity-based message route and topic-oriented
multicast which limits message broadcasting for each user.
However, the scheme enables riders to disclose part of the
matched drivers’ routes even though they will not share
the rider. However, the scheme suffer from the double
reservation attack since a rider can select multiple drivers
offers and not committing to them.
In [37], a general blockchain-based intelligent transporta-
tion framework is proposed. Also, a case study is presented
to discuss the impact of using blockchain in real-time ride-
sharing services. Semenko et al. [38] proposed a distributed
platform for ride-sharing services. The authors suggest
having an overlay network that includes all ride-sharing
agencies called service nodes to constitute the network layer.
The service node is responsible for matching drivers with
riders. However, the platform needs trusted infrastructure
to run it, and hence may fail in case of one service node is
compromised which in turn will lead to inherent problems
in the client-server model. Meng et al. [39] proposed a
ride-sharing scheme using vehicular fog computing. Road
Side Units (RSUs) installed at roads enable local matching
between riders and drivers. Anonymous authentication is
used to authenticate users while recovering malicious users
real identities. A private blockchain made of RSUs is pre-
sented to record ride-sharing data in an immutable ledger to
enable data auditability. However, using limited resources
devices such as RSUs to store massive records of ride-
sharing data may be impractical especially in urban areas
where there is a high demand to ride-sharing services.
10. https://dacsee.com/
11. https://arcade.city/
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have a decentralized ride sharing serivce
based on the revolutionry public blockchain named B-Ride.
The system is decentralized since all interactions are done
through the blockchain, and it does not require any com-
pany or organization to manage it, and the matching of
drivers with ride requests. Moreover, in B-Ride, there is no
need to reveal any private information such a email address,
phone number or credit card number, and generalized lo-
cations are only revealed to drivers. In addtion, to ensure
prior trust between drivers and riders, we have proposed a
time-locked deposit proctol that encourge divers and riders
to behave well in the system. Zero-knowledge set member-
ship is adopted so the driver can prove in zero-knolwede
that the he arrived to the rider pick-up location. Besides,
we using smart contracts and blockchain, we proposed a
fare payment based on elapsed distance. Finally, in B-Ride,
each driver should have a trust value in the system and
stored on the blockchain. Our evaluations shows that B-Ride
are practical with acceptable gas consumption and storage
cost. The efficiency and practicality of our designs are also
demonstrated by extensive experiments.
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